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Abstract 
A two phase study is reported on the same 100 
preschool and grade five children which investigates the 
relationship between age and locus of control. Phase 1 
examined reliabilities and validities of the Children's 
Locus of Control Scale and a Piaget-type measure of chance 
conceptualization in consideration of evidence that the 
relationship between age and internal locus of control 
reflects two control relevant constructs, perceived 
competence and perceived contingency. The two scales were 
found to be reliable and valid. Results suggested a direct 
relationship between perceived competence and chronological 
age, and an inverse relationship between perceived 
contingency and chronological age. Phase 2 examined the 
developmental effects of perceived competence and perceived 
contingency on locus of control. Children were exposed to 
identical experimental procedures and were distinguished in 
terms of expectancies for success under skill and chance 
conditions. Results confirmed that grade five children 
respond to the skill versus chance dichotomy in ways 
predicted by Rotter's theory of locus of control. However, 
preschool children respond in ways predicted by Piaget's 
cognitive developmental theory. It was contended that 
cognitions about competence and contingency mediate between 
situational variables and performance. 
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Introduction 
Theories of cognitive development may be contrasted on 
the issue of whether development is best described as a 
continuous process without marked behavioral reorganization 
or a step-by-step progression through a regular series of 
stages, each of which is distinguished by a particular 
behavioral structure. 
Structuralist theorists (Flavell, 1963; Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1975) contend that cognitive development moves 
through systematic and invariant stages. Each stage is 
defined by observable cognitive attributes and every 
consecutive stage in the sequence represents a 
reorganization of earlier stages into a functional totality 
which is qualitatively different from its antecedent. 
Connectionist and reinforcement theorists (Hull, 1952; 
Skinner, 1953) maintain that cognitive development is a 
continuous, additive consequence of differential 
environmental reinforcement. Maturity is represented by 
the gradual association of specific acts in response to 
environmental contingencies. 
Social learning theorists (Bandura, Adams, & Beyer, 
1977; Bandura & Walters, 1963; Rotter, 1982) concur with 
the connectionist view that the learning process is 
qualitatively similar at every point along the 
developmental continuum, however, they focus on the 
reciprocal relationship between the processes of cognition 
and information derived from the environment. Although 
1 
social learning theorists preserve connectionist variables 
of cue, response, and reinforcement, they also maintain 
that structuralist constructs cannot be dismissed easily. 
This is because they assert that stimulus and reinforcement 
contingencies produce an inappreciable impact on behavior 
unless they are first represented mentally. Specifically, 
social learning theorists depart from the strict 
determinism associated with a connectionist view in so far 
as they propose that mediational variables permit children 
to be active participants in their own development with 
respect to internal regulation and control of behavior. 
As a social learning theorist, Rotter (1975) endeavors 
to integrate connectionist and structuralist approaches to 
understanding human behavior. Rotter establishes an 
explicit relationship to connectionist psychology with his 
analogous concepts of expectancy, behavior potential, 
reinforcement, and psychological situation. 
On a descriptive level, these concepts approximate 
Hull's (1943) system of behavior which involves reaction 
potential, habit strength, drive, and independent 
variable--both formulations refer to learning (expectancy 
and habit strength), to response tendencies (behavior 
potential and reaction potential), to motivation (value of 
reinforcement and drive), and to controlling stimulus cues 
(psychological situation and independent variables). 
Rotter's (1982) constructs are related in the 
following way: predictions of the potential for a 
2 
particular behavior to occur require evaluation of the 
perceived expectancy that a given behavior will be 
successful, consideration of the value of the available 
reinforcement to the individual, and specification of the 
stimulus cues which constitute the psychological situation. 
Behavior at the complex human level is explained as a 
matter of selection for the individual, and selection is a 
function of expectancy, value of reinforcement, and 
psychological situation. 
Rotter's construct of expectancy developed out of his 
social learning theory as an intervening variable which 
makes possible more reliable predictions about how 
reinforcement changes human social behavior (James & 
Rotter, 1958). Expectancy influences how reinforcement 
will be interpreted by the individual. For example, once a 
person establishes an expectancy that reinforcement is 
either random or systematic, the effects of reinforcement 
will vary depending upon how the behavior-outcome 
relationship is characterized (Rotter, 1966). 
The construct, locus of control, operationalizes the 
mediating variable, expectancy, in the role of 
reinforcement. More specifically, locus of control refers 
to the perceived expectation for internal versus external 
control of reinforcement. Internal control signifies the 
expectation that rewards or punishments will be dependent 
upon one's own actions. External control signifies the 
expectation that reinforcement will be independent of one's 
3 
own actions because of chance, powerful others, or complex 
systems (Rotter, 1966, 1975). 
Rotter (1966) expressly defined the relationship 
between locus of control and reinforcement in the following 
way: 
If a person perceives a reinforcement as contingent 
upon his (sic] own behavior, then the occurrence of 
either a positive or a negative reinforcement will 
strengthen or weaken potential for that behavior to 
recur in the same or similar situation. If he (sic] 
sees the reinforcement as being outside his [sic] own 
control or not contingent, that is depending upon 
chance, fate, powerful others, or unpredictable, then 
the preceding behavior is less likely to be 
strengthened or weakened. (p. 5) 
Once more, the effect of a reinforcement depends, in 
part, on an individual's perception about the nature of the 
causal relationship between response and outcome. In order 
to test this relationship, Rotter (1966) postulated that 
locus of control could be manipulated by presenting 
subjects with cues associated with skill and chance 
situations. 
Internal control is induced in subjects when a 
situation is structured in such a way that outcomes are 
perceived as dependent upon responses (skill cues). Under 
these conditions, a strong, direct relationship is 
predicted between changes in outcome variables and response 
4 
measures. Given a sequence of trials on some performance 
task, human subjects will show an increase in expectancy 
for success on the following trial subsequent to positive 
reinforcement and a decrease in expectancy for success on 
the following trial in the absence of reinforcement. 
On the other hand, external control is induced in 
subjects when a situation is structured in such a way that 
outcomes are perceived as independent of response (chance 
cues). Under these conditions, Rotter predicted a weak and 
variable relationship between changes on outcome variables 
and response measures. Also, when presented with chance 
cues, Rotter predicted that subjects are likely to show 
more unusual shifts in behavior, which he operationally 
defined as "a raise in expectancy following negative 
reinforcement or a decrease in expectancy following 
positive reinforcement" (James & Rotter, 1958, p. 398). 
In summary, for a subject to consistently change 
behavior in response to outcome, the relationship between 
response and outcome must be perceived as internally 
controlled, that is, dependent or contingent on one's own 
actions, although the objective reality of the relationship 
may be externally controlled, that is, actually random or 
experimentally manipulated. 
Choice of task: Studies with adults 
Phares (1957) performed the first in a series of 
inquiries using adult volunteers to show that locus of 
control could be manipulated by the introduction of skill 
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and chance cues. He presented undergraduate students with 
color and line matching tasks which varied according to 
skill and chance instructions. Phares controlled a fixed 
pattern of reinforcement and applied a betting technique as 
the response measure of perceived control. On each 
acquisition trial, he asked his subjects to wager from 1 to 
10 chips on their probability of success for the following 
trial. Subjects received positive reinforcement by winning 
chips bet on correct trials. No reinforcement was provided 
on incorrect trials. 
As predicted by Rotter's hypothesis of locus of 
control, Phares' (1957) subjects behaved differently when 
exposed to skill and chance cues. Greater changes of 
expectations in the direction of past performance, that is 
usual shifts, were established when outcomes were perceived 
to be dependent on responses (contingent or skill 
condition) than when outcomes were perceived to be 
independent of responses (random or chance condition). The 
results for unusual shifts were not significant. Phares 
concluded that a situational analysis of expectancy changes 
using the skill versus chance dichotomy was feasible. 
In an ensuing study, Phares (1962) introduced skill 
and chance cues to measure recognition thresholds of adult 
volunteers to a tachistoscopic display of nonsense 
syllables under conditions of negative reinforcement. 
Visual symbols were paired with shock reinforcement, which 
was terminated when the subject pressed the correct control 
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button. Subjects in the skill situation were run first, 
and subjects in the chance situation were matched for 
pattern of reinforcement (escape from shock). 
Subjects who were exposed to shock under skill 
instructions were found to be significantly more alert, 
that is, showed smaller recognition thresholds for shock 
associated stimuli, than subjects who were given shock 
under chance instructions. Phares (1962) determined that 
adults learn more quickly under conditions where skill cues 
influence them to interpret reinforcements as contingent on 
personal attributes of competence or ability (internal 
control) than under conditions where chance cues imply 
noncontingency or unpredictability (external control). 
The effect of the skill versus chance dichotomy on 
locus of control in adults was demonstrated in subsequent 
experiments by Rotter and his associates (James & Rotter, 
1958; Rotter, Liverant, & Crowne, 1961). 
James and Rotter (1958) investigated acquisition and 
extinction of verbalized expectancies for success in 
undergraduate student volunteers given skill and chance 
instructions for a card guessing task. Expectancy for 
success was operationally defined as the probability 
verbalized by subjects on a scale from o to 10 (highest) 
that a particular reinforcement would occur in a specific 
situation. Responses to training schedules of 50% random 
reinforcement and 100% reinforcement were measured. 
James and Rotter (1958) obtained mixed results using 
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verbalized expectancy statements as a response measure. 
They established no significant difference between skill 
and chance cues under acquisition; however, some 
differences were obtained under extinction. James and 
Rotter maintained that their findings were sufficient to 
conclude that perceived expectancy acts as an intervening 
variable in complex human learning; and by implication, 
that this variable could be studied using the skill versus 
chance dichotomy. 
In a succeeding study, in which instructions were held 
constant but tasks were varied according to intrinsic cues, 
Rotter, Liverant, and Crowne (1961) tested the prediction 
that subjects will learn more from the occurrence of a 
reinforcement when they perceive outcome on a task to be 
dependent on response (contingent or internally 
controlled), than when outcome is perceived to be 
independent of response (random or externally controlled). 
Rotter et al. (1961) manipulated locus of control by 
asking undergraduate student volunteers to participate in 
two tasks, one of which required raising a platform without 
allowing a ball to fall off it (skill) and the other of 
which involved a card guessing game (chance). For each 
training schedule of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% reinforcement, 
the investigators controlled a fixed pattern of 
reinforcement by using experimenter-provided feedback about 
success. Subjects' verbal estimates about the likelihood 
of success on the subsequent trial (ranging from a low of O 
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to a high of 10) were used again as the response measure of 
expectancy. 
In this experiment, Rotter et al. (1961) found a 
significant interaction between contingency cues and 
reinforcement schedules under training conditions. 
Subjects in the skill situations verbalized a greater 
expectancy for success in the direction of previous 
reinforcement than subjects in the chance situations at 25% 
and 50% reinforcement. However, the difference was not 
significant between skill and chance groups at 50% and 100% 
reinforcement. The apparent interaction suggested to the 
investigators that pattern of reinforcement may be a cue in 
its own right which influences subjects' perceptions of 
locus of control. 
In some more contemporary inquiries, Langer (1975) and 
Langer and Roth (1975) verified that sequence of 
reinforcement influences expectancy. Langer showed that 
adults behave as though objectively chance events are 
controlled internally when the events are occasioned by a 
descending sequence of reinforcement, and a range of other 
skill cues such as choice, stimulus or response 
familiarity, passive or active involvement, and 
competition. Langer (1975) labelled this overestimate of 
personal control, which occurs in random situations 
occasioned by skill cues, as illusory control. She 
operationally defined illusory control as "an expectancy of 
a personal success probability inappropriately higher than 
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the objective probability would warrant" (p. 311). 
In a laboratory investigation, Langer and Roth (1975) 
brought about illusory control by manipulating the sequence 
of reinforcement. Undergraduate volunteers were asked to 
predict outcomes for themselves or others on 30 coin 
tosses. Subsequently, subjects received feedback about 
their success according to one of three experimenter 
controlled reinforcement schedules: a descending series in 
which success feedback was concentrated toward the starting 
trials, an ascending series in which success feedback was 
concentrated toward the finishing trials, and a random 
series. Response measures included a questionnaire 
designed to evaluate if subjects perceived the task as 
chance- or skill-determined and questions estimating 
success in the past and future. 
Langer and Roth (1975) determined that an early series 
of reinforcement, the descending condition, was associated 
with a skill orientation and an illusion of personal 
control. Also, people who were directly involved in 
prediction rated themselves higher than they rated others. 
Langer and Roth concluded that early reinforcement and an 
opportunity for involvement are salient factors which 
induce an illusion of control over apparently chance 
determined events even in sophisticated adult subjects. 
In a series of field studies Langer {1975) 
investigated other skill cues which induce a perception of 
exaggerated personal control. Choice was examined by 
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giving some adult subjects a lottery ticket and allowing 
others to select one. stimulus familiarity was varied by 
using tickets printed with letters of the alphabet versus 
line drawings of novel symbols. Practice was provided to 
induce response familiarity. In a passive involvement 
condition, an examiner manipulated the apparatus. In an 
active involvement situation, the subject moved a stylus. 
Competition was investigated by asking subjects to 
participate in a card game against a confederate who 
appeared confident or nervous. 
Langer (1975) established that the presentation of 
skill cues into objectively random events, in a variety of 
situations as specified above, significantly increased the 
likelihood that adult subjects would interpret and react to 
these events as if they were personally controllable. The 
power of this expectancy effect on subjects was 
demonstrated by their verbal predictions of greater success 
on future trials in the skill than in the chance 
situations. 
Choice of task: Studies with children 
The above studies dealt exclusively with sophisticated 
adult volunteers, most often with available samples of 
undergraduate students in psychology. There is doubt that 
generalizations from these restricted samples to a child 
population can be assumed to be valid (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 
1975). Mention of them is made to describe the variables 
which have been used to investigate locus of control and to 
11 
point out the need for research in locus of control where 
it is developmentally significant, namely among children. 
Consistent with connectionist and social learning 
theory, some researchers propose that locus of control is 
related to age in a continuous and direct manner. 
Investigators at the Fel's Research Institute (Crandall, 
Katkovsky, & Crandall, 1965) hypothesized that early in 
development, children perceive the world as externally 
controlled because of their dependence upon powerful others 
for instrumental help. According to this explanation, 
expectancies for internal control gradually increase, in an 
additive way, as children learn to associate success in 
attaining rewards with their own actions. 
In order to explore relations between children's 
reinforcement beliefs and age, measured by grade level, 
Crandall et al. (1965) developed the Intellectual 
Achievement Responsibility Questionnaire (IAR). This is a 
34 item forced-choice scale constructed to measure 
children's judgments about responsibility in achievement 
situations. However, using this measure with an extensive 
sample of 923 elementary- and high-school students in 
grades 3 through 12, Crandall et al. (1965) failed to find 
a significant increase in internality related to age. 
In a comprehensive review of the literature pertaining 
to locus of control, Lefcourt (1982) concurred with the 
observation that variables associated with age are likely 
sources of change in the perception of internal control. 
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However, Lefcourt pointed out that divergent opinions exist 
concerning essential aspects of the relationship. 
Specifically, Lefcourt alluded to some evidence 
in studies by Penk (1969) and Bialer (1961) which revealed 
a direct relationship between age and internal control, and 
contrary evidence found in studies by Weisz and Stipek 
(1982) which indicated an inverse relationship between 
these variables. 
Penk (1969) examined age and internal locus of control 
by means of the Children's Locus of Control Questionnaire 
(Bialer, 1961), a 23 item "yes" or "no" scale for children 
which is scored in the direction of internal control. The 
questionnaire was one of nine experimental tasks including 
the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Dunn, 1959) which Penk 
administered to five groups of children ranging in ages 
from 7 to 11 years old. Subjects were of average 
intelligence from middle-class families and attended 
parochial school. 
Penk (1969) hypothesized that age and internal control 
are directly related based on the essential construct of 
competence. Specifically, Penk predicted that associated 
with increasing mastery, measured by the receptive language 
score on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, there will be 
an attendant increase in a child's understanding that 
outcomes are under personal control, measured by the 
internal locus of control score on Bialer's scale. 
Penk (1969) established a low but significant positive 
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correlation between chronological age and internal control 
as evaluated by the Children's Locus of Control Scale(~= 
.27). A comparable positive intercorrelation was obtained 
between mental age on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test 
and internal control on the Bialer Scale (~ = .26). Penk 
concluded that the pattern of correlations was sufficient 
to demonstrate a direct relationship between mastery, 
measured by receptive vocabulary, and internal locus of 
control in children. 
Lefcourt (1982) noted that the study by Penk (1969) 
replicated an earlier report by Bialer (1961) in which a 
higher correlation was obtained between chronological age 
and internal control (~ = .37), measured by the Children's 
Locus of Control Questionnaire. However, Bialer 
established an even stronger correlation between mental 
age, measured by the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Dunn, 
1959), and internal locus of control by partialling out 
chronological age(~= .56). 
Among other relationships, Bialer (1961) examined 
developmental change in internal locus of control in a 
combined group of cognitively delayed and average children 
of both sexes. Children ranged from a chronological age of 
6-3 to 14-3 years, and from a mental age of 3-10 to 15-9 
years. Forty-five intellectually delayed children were 
selected from special education classes and 44 average 
children were drawn from regular classes in public schools. 
All subjects were administered several experimental tasks 
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in addition to the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Dunn, 
1959) . 
As postulated by Bialer {1961), results of the study 
indicated that mental age, rather than chronological age, 
was the more relevant variable related to the inclination 
among children to perceive internal locus of control. 
Bialer substantially increased the range and variability of 
mental age compared to chronological age in his sample by 
including cognitively delayed children. Consequently, when 
Bialer partialled out mental age, chronological age carried 
no significant weight in prediction of locus of control. 
In a reexamination of the studies by Bialer {1961) and 
Penk {1969), Weisz and Stipek {1982) proposed an 
alternative interpretation of their results. These 
researchers (Weisz & Stipek, 1982) postulated that 
developmental increases in internal control obtained by 
Bialer {1961) and Penk {1969) confused two logically 
independent dimensions of locus of control, perceived 
contingency and perceived competence. Weisz and Stipek 
(1982) defined perceived contingency as "the perceived 
responsiveness of the outcome to variations in the actor's 
behavior" (p. 262), and perceived competence as "the 
actor's self-assesed capacity to produce outcomes" (p. 
262) . 
Perceived contingency refers to whether or not a 
causal relationship is subjectively comprehended to exist 
between outcome and response. Perceived competence refers 
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to what one believes one can do given the character of the 
causal relationship and optimal effort. 
Weisz and Stipek (1982) concurred with the view that 
perceived competence is likely to increase with maturation 
as the child achieves actual mastery of the environment, 
but they contended that perceived contingency is likely to 
decrease with maturation as the child is introduced to the 
reality of a wide range of externally controlled events. 
Weisz and Stipek relied on the cognitive explanation 
of development formulated by Piaget (Flavell, 1963; Piaget 
& Inhelder, 1975) for support of their hypothesis that 
perceived contingency is inversely related to age. 
In studies of the development of causal attribution in 
children, Piaget (Flavell, 1963) determined that an infant 
interprets causality by understanding that all outcomes are 
linked to, and caused by, internal stimuli. The infant in 
sensorimotor stage misconstrues that internal events 
(indefinite feelings of effort and temporal contiguity) are 
responsible for external happenings. 
Piaget (Flavell, 1963) observed that accurate 
perceptions of causal relationships by children begin to 
develop in the preoperational period from about age 3 or 4 
to age 7. In part, as a consequence of increased social 
interaction, children's causal attributions begin to change 
from the egocentrism of the infant to the differentiated 
psychological and physical causality of the socialized 
adult. Children below the age of about 11 to 12 years 
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(when formal operational thought develops) are consequently 
not expected to be able to respond maturely to chance 
events. Applying Piagetian theory, one would predict that 
younger children will overestimate perceived contingency 
more than older children. 
In an effort to investigate a cognitive-developmental 
hypothesis of perceived contingency, Weisz (1980) studied 
children's judgments about chance outcomes in a card 
guessing game. Kindergarten and fourth grade children drew 
cards blindly from a shuffled deck to select colored spots 
and then predicted the winnings of other children. 
Response measures were coded answers to unstructured 
contingency questions and difference scores for predicted 
winnings of chips on paired comparison questions covering 
skill related content areas. 
Weisz (1980) found that kindergarten children were 
more likely than fourth grade children to exaggerate 
contingency in apparently random situations. In a chance-
controlled children's game, kindergarten children were 
shown to be more strongly influenced than fourth graders by 
competence related cues of age, practice, ability, and 
effort. Weisz concluded that illusory contingency is 
inversely related to maturation although even fourth 
graders believed that competence related cues were somewhat 
related to outcomes. 
Weisz (1981) replicated this evidence in a field study 
of children's contingency judgments performed at a state 
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fair. Investigators surveyed two groups of children, a 
younger group (mean age of 8 years and 8 months) and an 
older group (mean age of 12 years and 1 month) after the 
children had played one of four randomly selected chance 
games. Response measures were similar to those employed in 
the previous experiment, which included answers to 
unstructured contingency questions and predicted winnings 
of other children based on grade level, ability, effort, 
and practice. 
Weisz (1981) confirmed his previous findings that the 
overestimation of contingency by children is inversely 
related to age. Younger children rarely attributed chance 
outcomes of their own responses to random factors whereas 
older children often explained chance outcomes in terms of 
luck. Also, younger children expected significantly higher 
levels of success on chance tasks for players who were 
older, who were brighter, who were more experienced, and 
who tried harder. Consistent with Piagetian theory, the 
salience of illusory contingency was shown to diminish 
somewhat by adolescence. 
Statement of the problem 
Based on the studies presented above, there is 
conflicting and inconclusive evidence about the 
relationship between internal locus of control and 
maturation. The present study assesses this relationship 
in an elementary school population using different 
operations and methods to test six hypotheses. Phase 1 is 
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an interview validation study which tests the first two 
hypotheses, and Phase 2 is a multifactor repeated measures 
study which tests the remaining four hypotheses. 
Derivation of the hypotheses 
Phase 1 is, in part, an independent replication of the 
procedures used by Bialer (1961) and Penk (1969) to 
investigate the relationship between competence-based 
internal locus of control and age across a wider range of 
grade levels, operations, and methods than were previously 
explored. In accordance with the results of Bialer and 
Penk, the first hypothesis is stated formally as: 
First Hypothesis. The perceived competence dimension 
of internal locus of control is directly related to age in 
children. 
Prediction. Older children, defined by chronological 
age and mental age equivalent measured by the Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Test - Revised (Dunn, 1981), will 
respond more frequently in the perceived competence 
direction, measured by the Children's Locus of Control 
Questionnaire (Bialer, 1961), than younger children defined 
as above. 
The second major hypothesis of Phase 1 is concerned 
with the inverse relationship between contingency-based 
internal of locus of control and age found in studies by 
Weisz (1980, 1981) and Weisz and Stipek (1982). As 
indicated above, these investigators relied on a Piagetian 
explanation of chance conceptualization (Flavell, 1963; 
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Piaget & Inhelder, 1975) for a theoretical framework, 
although they did not specifically utilize Piagetian 
methods in their studies. 
In the present investigation, a Piagetian procedure 
for examining chance conceptualization was adapted to 
operationalize the perceived contingency dimension of 
internal locus of control. It was considered that the 
construct validity of perceived contingency could be 
enhanced by replicating the work of Weisz and Stipek using 
operations developed by Piaget. In accordance with the 
results of Weisz and Stipek, the second hypothesis is 
stated formally as: 
Second Hypothesis. The perceived contingency 
dimension of locus of control is inversely related to age 
in children. 
Prediction. Younger children, defined by 
chronological age and mental age equivalent measured by the 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test - Revised (Dunn, 1981), 
will respond more frequently in the perceived contingency 
direction, measured by the Piaget-type measure of chance 
conceptualization, than older children defined as above. 
In addition to substantive issues, Phase 1 examines 
the psychometric properties of the Children's Locus of 
Control Questionnaire (Bialer, 1961) and the Piaget-type 
measure of chance conceptualization. It is important to 
determine the power and the limitations of both measures 
for use with young children. Specifically, internal 
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consistency and retest reliabilities for the Bialer scale 
are analyzed along with retest and scorer reliabilities for 
the Piaget-type measure. 
Phase 2 of this study is an extension of experiments 
by Rotter (James & Rotter, 1958; Rotter, Liverant, & 
Crowne, 1961) and his associates (James, 1957; Phares, 
1957, 1962) which tested the effects of skill and chance 
variables on locus of control in adults. The experiment 
uses systematic manipulation of skill and chance variables 
to assess developmental differences in locus of control in 
a simultaneous study of preschool and grade five children. 
Betting behavior in response to reinforcement is used to 
operationalize expectancies for success. The larger the 
bet, on a scale from one to ten chips, the greater the 
expectancy for success. 
In review, Rotter's (1966, 1975) social learning 
theory specifies that people behave differently in 
situations where reinforcement is understood to depend upon 
skill as opposed to chance factors. Rotter speculated that 
under skill conditions or cues, adults are likely to 
conclude that a series of reinforced trials are produced by 
internal factors such as ability or competence. 
Under skill conditions, people use prior reinforcement 
as a basis for generalization to future reinforcement. 
Since the individual is the effective agent in a skill 
situation, one may logically generalize from past similar 
experiences. If one succeeds on a given trial, there 
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should be an accumulative increment in expectancy for 
future success because scores are a function of competency. 
On the other hand, if one fails on a given trial, there 
should be a decrement in expectancy of future success. 
Rotter (James & Rotter, 1958) labeled responses of 
this type, which are in the direction predicted by his 
locus of control hypothesis, as usual shifts. In an 
experimental study of female college students, Phares 
(1957) found evidence that usual shifts are, in fact, more 
frequent in a situation categorized by subjects as skill. 
Under chance conditions or cues, Rotter (James & 
Rotter, 1958) reasoned that adults are likely to understand 
during acquisition that a series of reinforced trials are 
brought about by external factors such as luck. 
Nevertheless, adults perceive reinforcement as providing 
some basis for generalization to future performance. They 
are likely to base their expectancy for reinforcement upon 
incorrect reasoning such as a series of reinforced trials 
will decrease the probability that a reinforcement is 
likely. Rotter identified this phenomenon as the gambler's 
fallacy, and he labeled the increments in expectancy 
following failure and the decrements in expectancy 
following success as unusual shifts. 
Rotter and his associates did not look into 
developmental aspects of locus of control. However, 
application of Piaget's (Piaget & Inhelder, 1975) theory of 
cognitive development to the skill versus chance dichotomy 
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suggests that, when formal operational thought emerges at 
about 11 to 12 years of age, children are likely to respond 
to the skill and chance dichotomy in ways which are 
predicted by Rotter's theory of locus of control for 
adults. 
According to Piaget and Inhelder (1975), children at 
the stage of formal operations understand chance and random 
mixture based on an intuitive grasp of permutations, that 
is, the return of elements in a random mixture to an 
original configuration is considered possible but very 
improbable given a large number of events. If 11 to 12 
year old children have a mature idea of chance, it is 
likely that they will show an adult pattern of responses to 
manipulation of skill and chance variables. 
Stemming from these findings, the third and fourth 
hypotheses are stated as follows: 
Third Hypothesis. Children, at a formal operations 
stage of cognitive development, conclude that a series of 
reinforced trials under skill conditions are produced by 
the internal control factor of competence. 
Prediction. Under skill conditions, defined by 
game, children in the formal operations group, defined by 
grade, will show a pattern of marked (significant) usual 
expectancy shifts in response to reinforcement, that is, 
increments after success and decrements after failure, in a 
series of trials measured by the number of chips bet per 
trial. 
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Fourth Hypothesis. Children, at a formal operations 
stage of cognitive development conclude that a series of 
reinforced trials under chance conditions are produced by 
the external control factor of luck. 
Prediction. Under chance conditions, defined by game, 
children in the formal operations group, defined by grade, 
will show a pattern of marked (significant) unusual 
expectancy shifts in response to reinforcement, that is, 
decrements after success and increments after failure, in a 
series of trials measured by number of chips bet per trial. 
In regard to younger children, Piaget and Inhelder 
(1975) maintained that preoperational children, at about 4 
to 7 years of age, interpret that random elements are 
somehow linked in a systematic way. Lacking an 
internalized standard of randomness or irreversibility, 
preoperational children impose order on many chance 
situations. 
If a mature sense of chance results in a pattern of 
relatively marked expectancy shifts, that is, significant 
increments and decrements of betting in response to 
reinforcement; it is logical to conclude that an immature 
sense of chance will result in a pattern of expectancy 
shifts which is relatively stable or uniform. Thus, 
preoperational children are expected not to use outcome 
feedback accumulatively in response to either skill or 
chance conditions. The resulting pattern of uniform 
responses is not predicted by Rotter's social learning 
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theory as it applies to adults. 
Also, because preoperational children regard perceived 
contingency as the prominent feature of both skill and 
chance situations; the average expectancy for 4 to 7 year 
old children, measured by the magnitude of each bet, should 
exceed the average expectancy shown by 11 to 12 year old 
children in the comparable comparison group. 
The rationale for this behavior was explicated by 
Weisz (1981) who found, in a field study of children's 
contingency judgments, that young children predicted 
certain baselines of success for outcomes under conditions 
of skill and chance. Weisz speculated that younger 
children make larger bets because they may expect to win at 
least certain minimal amounts, in effect, imposing 
subjective order (contingency) on both random and ordered 
situations. 
In conclusion, preoperational children have a stronger 
sense of perceived contingency which is explained by 
baseline reasoning across both skill and chance situations. 
The consequence of this floor effect is a relatively higher 
and more uniform rate of responding (higher and more stable 
expectancy for success) for preoperational children 
compared to formal operations children in both skill and 
chance situations. 
On the other hand, when expectancy for success 
(betting) is compared across skill and chance games for 
preoperational children, higher expectancy (larger bets) 
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are predicted in the skill game because contingency cues 
should be even more prominent than in the chance game. 
This result is important, in part, in order to show that 
preoperational children differentiate between the games. 
It also signifies that, although changes in betting from 
trial to trial may be relatively small in response to 
reinforcement, preoperational children understand that 
success is more likely to be associated with skill than 
chance cues. 
This process of reasoning leads to the last two 
hypotheses, which are formally stated as: 
Fifth Hypothesis. Children, at a preoperational stage 
of cognitive development, impose subjective order or 
contingency on both skill and chance situations. 
Prediction 1. Under skill and chance conditions, 
defined by game, children in the preoperational group, 
defined by grade, will show a pattern of uniform 
(insignificant) expectancy shifts in response to 
reinforcement in a series of trials measured by chips bet 
per trial. These children are expected not to use outcome 
feedback accumulatively in forming expectancies. 
Prediction 2. Under skill and chance conditions, 
defined by game, children in the preoperational group 
defined by grade, will show a higher overall expectancy for 
success, measured by the total number of chips bet per 
game, than children in the formal operations group, defined 
as above. 
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Sixth Hypothesis. Skill conditions produce higher 
expectancies for success than chance conditions for 
children at preoperational and formal operational stages of 
cognitive development. 
Prediction. Under skill conditions, defined by 
game, children in the preoperational group and children 
in the formal operational group, defined by grade, will 
show higher average expectancy for success than under 
chance conditions, measured by the total number of chips 
bet per game. 
Subjects 
Subjects were 100 four- to twelve-year old boys and 
girls selected randomly from prekindergarten screening and 
grade five of a middle income metropolitan Boston public 
school system. 
Interview protocols were obtained from the regular 
education screening of June, 1987. Interviews were 
conducted by the examiner (AT) in the position of 
consulting school psychologist for the cooperating school 
system. Protocols were used by the school system primarily 
for educational planning and program evaluation. 
Validation of all screening procedures was a secondary 
objective. Data were coded in such a manner that 
individual children cannot be identified. 
Subjects composed of two chronological age groups: (a) 
group 1, 51 preschool children of ages ranging from 4.3 to 
5.8 years (M = 5.2) and (b) group 2, 49 grade five children 
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of ages ranging from 10.3 to 12.2 years (M = 11.1). 
Summary statistics on grade, gender and age of subjects are 
shown in Table 1. Average standard scores for subjects 
derived from administration of the Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary Test - Revised are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 1 
Chronological Ages of Subjects in Years 
SD n 
Preschool 
Boys 5. 21 .38 23 
Girls 5.19 .26 28 
Grade 5 
Boys 11.20 .42 25 
Girls 11.10 .43 24 
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Table 2 
Standard Scores of Subjects on the Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary Test - Revised 
n 
Preschool 
Boys 104.33 14.8 23 
Girls 101.37 8.8 28 
Grade 5 
Boys 106.00 8.2 25 
Girls 103.62 12.3 24 
30 
Phase 1: An Interview Validation Study 
The purpose of Phase 1 was to evaluate the 
psychometric properties of the Bialer Locus of Control 
Scale and the Piaget-type measure of chance 
conceptualization in consideration of evidence that the 
perceived competence dimension of locus of control is 
directly related to age and the perceived contingency 
dimension of locus of control is inversely related to age. 
The study replicates and extends prior research on 
developmental aspects of locus of control by considering a 
wider range of grade levels and the two measures of causal 
attribution. 
Method 
Subjects 
The 100 randomly selected elementary school children 
were assigned to first administration conditions in 
counterbalanced order. Thirty-four preschool children and 
33 grade five children were randomly chosen for a retest of 
the Bialer Locus of Control Scale (Bialer,1961) and the 
Piaget-type measure. 
Materials 
Materials included the Bialer Locus of Control 
Questionnaire (Bialer, 1961), the Piaget-type measure of 
chance conceptualization adapted for this study, and Form L 
of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised (Dunn, 
1981). 
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Bialer Locus of Control Questionnaire. The Bialer 
Locus of Control Questionnaire (Bialer, 1961) was used as a 
competence-based measure of internal locus of control. 
Bialer (1961) developed the questionnaire from the 
James-Phares (James, 1957) adult scale of internal-external 
control. As indicated previously, the scale consists of 23 
verbally administered questions in an agree/disagree format 
which are scored in the internal direction. Eighteen items 
are scored internal upon a "Yes" response, and five items 
are scored internal upon a "No" response. A sample of the 
Bialer Locus of Control Questionnaire may be reviewed in 
Appendix A. 
In view of the numerous items scored "Yes," the 
plausibility that the scale is affected by response set 
bias should be questioned. However, based on a sample of 
189 moderately retarded adults, Bialer (Gozali & Bialer, 
1968) obtained insignificant correlations between scores 
on the Children's Locus of Control Questionnaire and two 
independent measures of response set bias or social 
desirability, the True-False form of the Children's 
Social Desirability Questionnaire (Crandall, Katkovsky, & 
Crandall, 1965) and the Couch and Keniston Agreement 
Response Scale (cited in Gozali & Bialer, 1968). 
In the same study, Bialer (Gozali & Bialer, 1968) 
investigated the stability of the scale. Test-retest 
scores, obtained using a seven day interval (N = 60), 
yielded a reliability coefficient of .84 (Pearson). Also, 
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an alternate-forms reliability coefficient of .67 was 
obtained when scores on the Children's Locus of Control 
Questionnaire were correlated with a reverse version of the 
questionnaire (N = 36). 
Battle and Rotter (1963) found some evidence for the 
validity of the Bialer Locus of Control Scale in a 
procedure which called for the administration of a line 
matching task, a projective instrument, and the Bialer 
scale to 80 sixth- and eighth-grade children. Battle and 
Rotter obtained a significant correlation (-.42) between 
the Children's Picture Test of Internal-External Control 
originated by Battle, and the Bialer Locus of Control 
Questionnaire. The Children's Picture Test is scored in 
the external direction accounting for the negative 
relationship. 
Battle and Rotter also found that the Bialer scale 
correlated significantly with the number of unusual 
responses to reinforcement (~ = -.47) on an adaptation of 
a line matching task developed by James (1957). Subjects 
scoring low-internal on the Bialer scale raised 
expectancies after failure and lowered them after success 
more than subjects scoring high-internal. 
Piaget-type measure. This apparatus is similar to a 
device used by Piaget and Inhelder (1975) to measure 
chance conceptualization in children. Materials consist 
of a rectangular tray (27 cm x 40 cm) which rests on a 
crosswise axle, allowing it to seesaw. In the starting 
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position, the box is inclined toward one of its ends. A 
group of three red marbles and a group of three black 
marbles are arranged across its width at the lower end. 
A Trajectory Drawing Form (22 x 28 cm white bond 
paper) which represents the outline of the apparatus is 
provided as a measure of random mixture and reversibility. 
A sample Trajectory Drawing Form is duplicated in Appendix 
B. The form shows the original positions of the marbles, 
in color, with blank positions outlined to indicate 
possible final arrangements of the marbles. Children are 
provided with red and black marking pens to color the paths 
of marbles from original to final locations. 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test - Revised. The 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised, Form L (Dunn, 
1981) was used as a verbally based measure of mental age 
equivalent. The PPVT-R is an individually administered, 
norm-referenced, power test of hearing vocabulary which 
was standardized on a sample of 5,028 persons including 
4,200 children and 828 adults. 
Form L contains 5 training items, followed by 175 
test items arranged in order of increasing difficulty. 
Each item has four simple, black-and-white illustrations 
arranged in a multiple-choice format. 
Psychometric properties reported in the Manual for 
the PPVT-R, Forms Land M, include internal consistency 
and alternate-forms reliability (Dunn, 1981). Split-half 
correlations were calculated for all 5,028 subjects (age 
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2 1/2 through 40 years) in the standardization sample. 
Internal consistency estimates corrected by the Spearman-
Brown formula ranged from .67 to .88 for Form L (median 
.80), and from .61 to .86 for Form M (median .81). 
Alternate-forms reliabilities were derived from the 
counterbalanced administration of Forms Land M to 642 
subjects selected from the standardization sample to 
represent each age group from 2 1/2 through 18 years. 
These coefficients of equivalence for raw scores based on 
immediate retest ranged from .73 to .91 (median .82). 
For PPVT-R standard scores, coefficients of equivalence 
ranged from .71 to .89 (median .79). 
Delayed retest alternate-forms reliabilities, which 
were obtained after an interval of from 9 to 31 days, 
were reported on 962 subjects (age 2 1/2 to 18) selected 
from the standardization sample to represent each age, 
sex, occupation, and race. These coefficients of 
stability, based on delayed retest, ranged from .52 to 
.90 (median .78) for raw scores and from .54 to .90 
(median .77) for standard scores. 
No criterion-related validity data were described in 
the Manual. However, Dunn (1981) determined the 
equivalence of scores on the 1981 Form L of the PPVT-R 
with the 1959 Form A of the PPVT in a study of 1,849 
children, ages 3 through 18 years, separate from the 
standardization group. The median PPVT-R standard score 
equivalent was 7 to 8 points lower than the median PPVT 
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IQ, with a range of from 5 to 17 points lower. 
Design 
Results were evaluated by intercorrelations. Kuder-
Richardson Formula 20 was applied to Bialer responses to 
determine the internal consistency of the scale and 
product-moment correlations were used for measures of 
relationship. Counterbalancing the order of presentation 
of all measures was employed to minimize sequence effects. 
The Bialer and Piaget-type scales were analyzed by test-
retest. The Piaget-type measure was scored by two 
independent raters. 
Procedure 
Bialer Locus of Control Questionnaire. Children 
were administered the Bialer Questionnaire in accordance 
with Bialer's instructions (Bialer, 1961) described in 
Appendix A. 
Piaget-type measure. The same male experimenter 
(AT) conducted all performance sessions. Each child, was 
seen individually, and seated at a table opposite the 
experimenter. A few minutes were spent putting the child 
at ease and the child was invited to play a game using 
the following pretested instructions: 
See these marbles lined up in the box. Put your 
finger on the red ones. Now put your finger on the 
black ones. The box can be tipped so that the marbles 
will move to the other side and back again. (The 
experimenter demonstrates how the box moves while 
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holding the marbles in place.) 
Now watch what happens when the gate is opened 
and the box is tipped. (The experimenter tips the 
box.) See how some of the marbles are in different 
positions. (The child is given five seconds to 
examine the marbles, then the experimenter returns 
the marbles to their original positions.) 
Here are two colored pens, a red one and a 
black one, you are to draw on this paper how the 
marbles will line up when they return to the starting 
gate. (The child is given two pens and a trajectory 
drawing form with the original positions of red and 
black marbles colored in two groups.) 
Use this form to show me if the red ones will 
stay on one side of the box and the black ones on the 
other side, or if they will get mixed up. Draw how 
the marbles will line up when they return to this side 
of the box. (The child completes the drawing and is 
subsequently asked two questions). 
What will happen if the box is moved many 
times? Will the marbles get back to where they 
started? 
The Piaget-type game of random mixture and 
reversibility was scored in the contingency or 
reversibility direction, that is, subjects who drew the 
marbles returning in a systematic way scored higher. The 
scoring procedures, which were developed for the current 
37 
investigation, are described in Appendix C. 
Mental age. Children were administered the Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Test (Dunn, 1981) in accordance with 
instructions in the manual in order to obtain mental age 
equivalency and IQ scores. 
Results 
First administration total sample (N = 100) 
intercorrelations across grade levels between the Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised (PPVT-R), the Bialer Locus 
of Control Questionnaire and the Piaget-type measure of 
Randomness and Reversibility were .41 (p < .001) and -.69 
(p < .001), respectively. Pearson coefficients between 
these measures and chronological age are presented in Table 
3. 
First Hypothesis 
Competence-based internality, measured by the Bialer 
scale, was directly related to chronological age (.43) 
and increased verbal ability on the PPVT-R (.41). The 
correlation obtained in the current study between Bialer 
and PPVT scores is intermediary between the value (.26) 
reported by Penk (1969) who examined average children, and 
the value (.56) reported by Bialer (1961) who examined 
average and intellectually subaverage children. 
Second Hypothesis 
Contingency-based internality, measured by the 
Piaget-type scale, showed strong and inverse relationships 
to chronological age (-.69) and verbal ability (-.69). The 
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Table 3 
Intercorrelations Between Chronological Age, Verbal 
Ability and Locus of Control Measures for Elementary 
School Children 
Measure 2 3 4 
Preschool and fifth grade children (N = 100) 
1. Chronological Age 
2. PPVT-R 
3. Bialer 
4. Piaget-type 
* 12. < • 001 
.94* 
39 
.43* 
.41* 
-.69* 
-.69* 
-.19 
intercorrelation of the two locus of control scales was 
insignificant indicating that they are measuring different 
dimensions of generalized expectancies. 
Table 4 lists the mean, standard deviation, median, 
mode, skew, and kurtosis of each measure of age and locus 
of control for the groups. The total sample size consists 
of 51 preschool and 49 grade five students. The frequency 
distributions of the measures are generally symmetrical and 
rather flat. 
The Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 coefficient for the 
Bialer total sample (N = 100) was .58. KR-20 estimates for 
each grade level ranged from .55 for preschool (n = 51) to 
.47 for grade 5 (n = 49). These estimates are more 
consistent than values obtained by Halpin and Ottinger 
(1983) in a recent study of Bialer Scale reliabilities. 
Their estimates ranged from .32 for grade 4 to .57 for 
grade 6. 
Stability coefficients of the locus of control 
measures for total sample, preschool and grade five are 
presented in Tables 5, 6 and 7, respectively. 
Total retest sample (n = 67) reliability was .68 (2 
< .001) for the Bialer scale. Gozali and Bialer (1968) 
obtained a higher retest reliability coefficient (.84) 
for the Bialer scale in a study of 60 intellectually 
subaverage adolescents and adults ranging in ages from 16 
to 30. Total retest sample reliability for the Piaget-
type measure (n = 64) was .83 (2 < .001). 
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Table 4 
Chronological Age, Verbal Ability and Locus of 
Control Scores for Elementary School Children 
Measure 
CA 
PPVT-R 
Bialer 
Piaget-type 
Measure 
Mean 
8.00 
8.46 
13.54 
6.13 
Mean 
CA 5.20 
PPVT-R 5.43 
Bialer 12.18 
Piaget-type 8.82 
Total Sample (N = 100) 
SD 
3.00 
3.45 
3.28 
4.18 
Median Mode 
5.67 10.67 
7.50 4.58 
14.00 12.00 
5.00 13.00 
Skew 
.12 
.24 
-.28 
.52 
Preschool (n = 51) 
SD Median Mode Skew 
3.32 
1.04 
3.17 
3.86 
5.17 
5.41 
12.00 
9.50 
5.08 -.37 
4.58 .39 
14.00 -.31 
13.00 -.38 
Grade Five (n = 49) 
Measure Mean SD Median Mode Skew 
CA 11.11 
PPVT-R 11.84 
Bialer 15.04 
Piaget-type 3.13 
.41 
1.42 
2.70 
1.85 
11.08 
11. 33 
15.00 
3.00 
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10.67 
11.00 
12.00 
3.00 
.71 
1.10 
.11 
.78 
Kurtosis 
-1.96 
-1. 37 
.04 
-1.12 
Kurtosis 
-.25 
.33 
.04 
-1.17 
Kurtosis 
.37 
.66 
-1.07 
.33 
Table 5 
Stability Coefficients of the Bialer and 
Piaget-type Measures 
Measure 
Condition Bialer 
First Testing 
n 67 
M 13.49 
SD 3.35 
Second Testing 
n 67 
M 13.60 
SD 3.12 
!: .68* 
* p < • 001 
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Piaget-type 
64 
5.98 
4.43 
64 
6.34 
4.02 
.83* 
Table 6 
Stability Coefficients of the Bialer and Piaget-type 
Measures for Preschool Children 
Measure 
Condition Bialer Piaget-type 
First Testing 
.n 34 32 
M 12.00 9.00 
SD 3.23 4.28 
Second Testing 
.n 34 32 
M 12.15 9.22 
SD 3.05 3.58 
!: .50* .73** 
* 12 < • 01 ** 12 < .001 
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Table 7 
Stability Coefficients of the Bialer and Piaget-type 
Measures for Grade Five Children 
Measure 
Condition Bialer Piaget-type 
First Testing 
n 33 32 
M 15.03 2.97 
SD 2.77 1.70 
Second Testing 
n 33 32 
M 15.09 3.47 
SD 2.44 1.72 
!: .73** .43* 
* :p_ < .05 ** :p_ < .001 
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Bialer scale retest reliabilities ranged from .50 
(2 < .01) for preschool children (n = 34) to .73 (2 < .001) 
for grade five children (n = 33). Piaget-type measure 
retest reliabilities ranged from .73 (2 < .001) for 
preschool children (n = 32) to .43 (2 < .05) for grade 
five children (n = 32). 
Rater reliability for total sample (N = 100) first 
administration of the Piaget-type measure was .97 (2 < 
.001) (Pearson) and gives further evidence of the 
reliability of the measure. Correlations ranged from .96 
(2 < .001) for the preschool sample (n = 51) to .84 (2 < 
.001) for the grade five sample (n = 49). 
Drawings of grade five children were more complex 
than drawings of preschool children and this is reflected 
in somewhat lower consistency of scoring for grade five 
drawings by raters. 
45 
Phase 2: A Multifactor Repeated Measures Study 
The purpose of Phase 2 of the study was to demonstrate 
the effects of perceived competence and perceived 
contingency within the same set of experimental procedures 
and to assess the developmental effects of these variables 
on locus of control. Two groups were exposed to the same 
stimuli and were distinguished in terms of response to 
feedback conditions. 
Method 
Subjects 
Subjects were the same 100 elementary school children 
who participated in Phase 1 of the study. The children 
were assigned to experimental conditions in counterbalanced 
order. 
Materials 
Chance game. These materials are similar to those 
used by Weisz {1980). They consist of 80 poker chips, two 
decks each of eight white cards (7.5 x 13 cm), half with 
green spots on one side, half with yellow spots one side, 
and a small container (6 x 10 cm) for chips won. 
Skill game. Ten Muller-Lyer type illusion designs 
(cited in Woodworth & Schlosberg, 1964) of varying lengths 
with outward pointing angles at their ends are identified 
by numbers ranging from 1 to 10. They consist of 
vertically placed black lines which are .30 cm in thickness 
and range in length from 23 to 13 cm. They are drawn on 22 
x 28 cm white bond paper. A sample Muller-Lyer type 
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reference design is presented in Appendix D. 
Eight of the ten reference designs are devised in such 
a manner that they match (within .15 cm) the lengths of 
eight vertical stimulus lines with inward angles drawn on 
22 x 28 white bond paper and placed on a clipboard in 
prearranged order. A sample Muller-Lyer type stimulus 
design is presented in Appendix E. 
The Muller-Lyer designs were used in order to make the 
actual differences between line lengths more ambiguous, 
allowing for control of reinforcements by the experimenter. 
Pretesting of the task with adult volunteers indicated that 
two additional, non-matching, reference lines were needed 
to confound some subjects who attempted to use a process of 
elimination to win the game. The materials also included 
80 poker chips. 
Procedure 
Chance game. Eight white cards are spread out in 
front of the child, four with a yellow spot on one side, 
and four with a green spot on one side. The child is asked 
to count out four yellows, and four greens. The child is 
asked to assist the experimenter in mixing the cards. 
While lining up 80 poker chips in front of the child, the 
experimenter says: 
For this game, you must draw yellow cards from the 
deck in order to win. Each time that you play, you 
can bet up to ten chips. When you get a yellow card, 
you will win the chips that you bet in that game and 
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we will place them in this container. When you draw a 
green card, you will loose the chips that you bet in 
that game. You will get to bet eight times. If you 
win enough chips, you will win a prize. 
Remember, the more sure you are that you will be 
correct, the more chips that you should bet. 
I have found that success at this game is 
entirely a matter of luck. 
Winnings are controlled by using two eight-card decks, 
one deck with yellow and green spots in a prearranged 
order. After betting eight times, all children are given a 
prize. The response measure is the number of chips bet in 
each trial. 
Skill game. Ten Muller-Lyer reference designs of 
varying length and outward angles are placed on a display 
board. The child is seated comfortably at an uncluttered 
table approximately 3 meters away from the display board. 
The child is asked to count the numbers, one through ten, 
which accompany the designs on the board. 
Eight stimulus designs with inward pointing angles are 
consecutively shown to the child in prearranged order, one 
design for each trial. The instructions to the child are 
made as identical as possible to instructions for the 
chance game except for emphasis on attributing success to a 
skill situation. The experimenter says: 
I have eight designs here on this clip board. For 
this game, you are to tell me which lines on the clip 
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board are the same length as the lines on the display 
board when the differences between the lines are 
small. 
Each time that you play, you can bet up to 10 
chips. When you are correct, you will win the chips 
that you bet in that game. When you are incorrect, 
you will loose the chips that you bet in that game. 
You will get to bet eight times. If you win enough 
chips, you will win a prize. 
Remember, the more sure you are that you will 
be correct, the more chips that you should bet. 
I have found that some kids have a special 
skill at this game and usually do better than others. 
Winnings are controlled by feedback from the 
experimenter. After the eighth trial, all children are 
given a prize. The response measure is the number of chips 
bet for each trial. 
Betting technique. The betting technique which is 
used as the dependent measure of expectancy for success for 
the games was developed by Castaneda (cited in Phares, 1957 
and James, 1957). It provides subjects with objects of 
value which are used to bet on performance. The amount of 
the bet is considered an objective and quantified 
representation of the expectancy value on a Likert-type 
scale ranging from 1 to 10. 
Rotter, Fitzgerald, and Joyce (1954) supported the 
construct validity of the betting technique for adults (N = 
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120) in a comparison of the task with three different 
verbal measures of expectancy. Although the betting or 
behavioral technique produced significantly higher absolute 
expectancy ratings, mean ratings were highly correlated 
(.99) with the verbal measure in which subjects were asked 
to rate, on a ten-point scale, their probability of success 
on six trials. Rotter et al. concluded that the two 
methods measure the same construct. 
Results 
The expectancy measure was the number of chips bet per 
trial (range from 1 to 10). Data were analyzed by a 2 x 2 
x 2 x 8 (Grade x Gender x Game x Trial) fixed effects 
analysis of variance with repeated measures on the last two 
variables. Table 8 shows the ANOVA summary. Grade and 
gender were between-subjects variables. Game and trial 
were within-subjects variables. 
Means and standard deviations of the expectancy data 
for all conditions are presented in Tables 9 and 10. 
Significant main effects were found for grade, K(l, 96) = 
10.91, £ < .001; game, K(l, 96) = 36.25, 2 < .001; and 
trial, K(7, 672 = 2.82, 2 < .01. Significant interactions 
were found for Game x Trial, K(7, 672) = 5.46, 2 < .001; 
and Grade x Game x Trial, K(7, 672) = 3.08, 2 < .01. No 
significant main effects or interactions were found for the 
variable of gender. 
As predicted, the main effect for grade is consistent 
with the decreasing expectancy of success as a function of 
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Table 8 
Summary of Analysis of Variance for Expectancy Scores 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square .E 
Between Subjects 
Grade (GR) 577.04 1 577.04 10.91** 
Gender (GN) 34.13 1 34.13 .65 
GR X GN 5.70 1 5.70 .11 
Sub. w. groups 5075.52 96 52.87 
Within Subjects 
Game (GM) 281.28 1 281.28 36.25** 
GR X GM 5.74 1 5.74 .74 
GN X GM 11.51 1 11. 48 1.48 
GR X GN x GM 26.07 1 26.07 3.36 
GM X sub. w. groups 744.96 96 7.76 
Trial (T) 85.25 7 12.18 2.82* 
GR X T 36.54 7 5.22 1.21 
GN X T 18.14 7 2.59 .60 
GR X GN X T 39.94 7 5.71 1. 32 
TX sub. w. groups 2901.49 672 4.32 
GM X T 141. 74 7 20.25 5.46** 
GR X GM X T 80.01 7 11. 43 3.08* 
GN X GM X T 18.49 7 2.64 .71 
GR X GN x GM X T 19.73 7 2.82 .76 
GM X T X sub. w. groups 2494.12 672 3.71 
* p < • 01. ** p < . 001. 
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Table 9 
Expectancy Scores for Preschool Children QV Gender, 
Game, and Trial 
Trial 
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Skill 
Male 
M 5.52 6.22 6.78 6.48 7.52 6.26 6.26 
SD 3.16 3.15 2.81 3.06 2.87 3.40 2.85 
Female 
M 5.39 5.11 5.50 5.35 6.21 6.11 6.14 
SD 3.34 2.64 2.66 2.70 2.60 2.66 2.66 
Chance 
Male 
M 5.26 4.70 5.74 5.17 5.43 4.91 5.52 
SD 3.51 3.44 3.57 3.11 3.65 3.40 3.41 
Female 
M 5.14 5.29 5.04 5.68 5.39 6.11 5.68 
SD 3.17 2.80 3.09 3.01 2.94 2.57 2.84 
8 
6.00 
3.30 
6.43 
2.73 
5.13 
3.43 
5.57 
2.83 
Note. Preschool sample was n = 23 for males and n = 28 for 
females. 
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Table 10 
Expectancy Scores for Grade Five Children }2y Gender, 
Game and Trial 
Trial 
Group · 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Skill 
Male 
M 4.56 5.36 6.04 4.36 5.32 4.80 
SD 1.64 2.14 2.51 1. 66 2.46 1.96 
Female 
M 4.29 4.50 5.46 4.67 5.54 4.79 
SD 1.60 1. 69 2.00 1. 83 2.08 2.48 
Chance 
Male 
M 4.76 3.84 3.08 4.24 4.12 4.20 
SD 2.28 2.50 2.40 2.31 2.95 2.41 
Female 
M 3.71 3.67 3.12 3.67 3.71 3.79 
SD 1.55 2.41 2.59 1.68 2.25 2.45 
Note. Grade five sample was n = 25 for males 
and n = 24 for females. 
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7 
4.36 
2.46 
3.75 
1.57 
5.32 
2.23 
4.62 
2.72 
8 
6.48 
2.29 
5.67 
2.65 
4.72 
3.33 
4.00 
3.09 
grade. The right column of Table 11 shows higher overall 
expectancy for success by preschool children (M = 5.71) 
compared to grade five children (M = 4.52) collapsed across 
gender, game, and trial. 
The main effect for game implies that children in the 
skill condition (M = 5.53) have higher expectancy for 
success than children in the chance condition (M = 4.70). 
The right column of Table 12 shows the game effect 
collapsed across grade, gender, and trial. 
The main effect for trial implies that changes in 
expectancy are a result of the reinforcement schedule. 
Table 13 shows that trials 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 vary 
monotonically with outcome when trials are collapsed across 
grade, gender, and game. 
Furthermore, inspection of the means associated with 
the Game x Trial interaction collapsed across grade and 
gender (shown in Table 14), and simple effects tests, 
indicate that the game condition difference occurred 
between skill and chance conditions on trials 2, 3, 5, and 
8. The four significant f values, in respective order, are 
f(l, 768) = 4.59, n < .os; f(l, 768) = 16.s2, n < .001; 
f(l, 768) = 12.46, n < .001; and f(l, 768) = 9.71, n < .01. 
Table 15 presents the mean expectancy scores and 
standard deviations associated with the Grade x Game x 
Trial interaction collapsed across the nonsignificant 
variable of gender. This significant interaction supports 
the prediction that children's expectancies for success 
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Table 11 
Expectancy Scores of Elemenary School Children J2y Grade 
Game 
Group Skill Chance Overall 
Preschool 
M 6.05 5.37 5.71 
SD 2.90 3.17 3.03 
Grade Five 
M 5.00 4.04 4.52 
SD 2.01 2.44 2.23 
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Table 12 
Expectancy Scores of Elementary School Children l2v Game 
Grade 
Game Preschool Grade Five Overall 
Skill 
M 6.05 5.00 5.53 
SD 2.90 2.01 2.45 
Chance 
M 5.37 4.04 4.70 
SD 3.17 2.44 2.80 
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Table 13 
Expectancy Scores for Elementary School Children l2v Trial 
Type of 
Reinforcement 
M 
SD 
1 
4.84 
2.68 
2 
+ 
4.84 
2.67 
3 
+ 
5.08 
2.82 
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Trial 
4 
4.96 
2.58 
5 
+ 
5.40 
2.83 
6 
5.15 
2.77 
7 
5.22 
2.72 
8 
+ 
5.52 
2.95 
Table 14 
Expectancy Scores for Elementary School Children J2y 
Game and Trial 
Trial 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Game 
Skill 
M 4.95 5.28 5.92 5.20 6.13 5.50 5.15 
SD 2.60 2.50 2.53 2.48 2.70 2.71 2.64 
Chance 
M 4.73 4.40 4.25 4.72 4.68 4.80 5.30 
SD 2.77 2.84 3.12 2.68 3.03 2.82 2.81 
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8 
6.16 
2.73 
4.88 
3.17 
Table 15 
Expectancy Scores for Elementary School Children 12v. 
Grade, Game and Trial 
Trial 
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Preschool <n = 51) 
Skill 
M 5.45 5.61 6.08 5.86 6.80 6.18 6.20 
SD 3.23 2.91 2.78 2.89 2.78 2.99 2.72 
Chance 
M 5.20 5.02 5.35 5.45 5.41 5.57 5.61 
SD 3.29 3.09 3.30 3.03 3.25 3.00 3.08 
Grade Five <n = 49) 
Skill 
M 4.43 4.94 5.75 4.51 5.43 4.80 4.06 
SD 1.61 1.96 2.27 1.73 2.26 2.21 2.07 
Chance 
M 4.24 3.75 3.10 3.96 3.92 4.00 4.98 
SD 2.01 2.43 2.49 2.03 2.61 2.41 2.48 
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8 
6.24 
3.00 
5.37 
3.09 
6.08 
2.48 
4.37 
3.21 
vary as a function of grade, game, and outcome. The means 
associated with the Grade x Game x Trial interaction are 
represented graphically in Figure 1 for fifth grade 
children and in Figure 2 for preschool children. 
Third Hypothesis 
The third hypothesis stated that, for children at the 
stage of formal operations, skill conditions are related to 
the perception of internal locus of control based on the 
salient dimension of competency. It was predicted that, 
under skill conditions, formal operations children, 
represented by the grade five group, will show a pattern of 
usual expectancy shifts in response to reinforcement, that 
is, increments after success and decrements after failure. 
The third hypothesis involved comparisons of mean 
expectancies across trials of grade five children at the 
skill game condition. 
Means and standard deviations of the game by trial 
interaction for grade five are shown in the lower portion 
of Table 15 and graphically in Figure 1. The simple 
effects test on the Game x Trial interaction for grade five 
was sigificant, E(7, 672) = 7.65, p < .001; and the simple, 
simple effects test on the skill trials for grade five was 
significant, E( 7, 2688) = 5.83, p < .001. 
Inspection of Figure 1 and comparisons of the eight 
skill trial means of grade 5 children using Tukey's HSD 
test (p < .05) {Glass & Stanley, 1970; Winer, 1971) 
revealed a pattern of usual expectancy shifts. Under skill 
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conditions, expectancies of grade five children varied 
monotonically with outcome history, indicating that they 
used the feedback accumatively in forming their 
expectancies. Specifically, a significant increment in 
mean expectancy was found between trials 1 and 3 following 
success; a significant decrement was found between trials 3 
and 4 following failure; a significant decrement was found 
between trials 5 and 7 following failure; and a significant 
increment was found between trials 7 and 8 following 
success. 
Fourth Hypothesis 
The fourth hypothesis stated that, for children at the 
stage of formal operations, chance conditions are related 
to the perception of external locus of control based on a 
mature understanding of probability. Using this reasoning, 
it was predicted that, under chance conditions, formal 
operations children, represented by the grade five group, 
will show a pattern of unusual expectancy shifts in 
response to reinforcement, that is, decrements after 
success and increments after failure. This pattern of 
expectancies is the inverse of the pattern of expectancies 
predicted for the skill game. 
The fourth hypothesis involved comparisons of mean 
expectancies across trials of grade five children at the 
chance game condition. 
Means and standard deviations of chance trials for 
grade five are shown at the bottom of Table 15 and 
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graphically in Figure 1. The simple, simple effects test 
on the chance trials for grade five was significant, E( 7, 
2688) = 3.52, p < .001. 
Inspection of Figure 1 and comparisons of the eight 
chance trial means of grade 5 children using Tukey's HSD 
test (p < .05) (Glass & Stanley, 1970; Winer, 1971) 
revealed a pattern of unusual expectancy shifts. Under 
chance conditions, the expectancies of grade five children 
varied monotonically with outcome history, and inversely 
with skill expectancies, indicating that they used the 
feedback accumatively in forming their expectancies. 
Specifically, a significant decrement in mean expectancy 
was found between trials 1 and 3 following success, and a 
significant increment was found between trials 3 and 7 
following failure. 
Fifth Hypothesis 
The fifth hypothesis stated that children at the 
preoperational stage of development impose subjective order 
or contingency on both skill and chance situations. For 
these children, contingency is the salient variable for 
both skill and chance games. This hypothesis lead to a 
pair of predictions. 
Firstly, it was predicted that preoperational 
children, represented by the preschool group, will show an 
essentially flat profile of expectancies in response to 
success/failure feedback in both skill and chance games. 
In other words, it was predicted that outcome feedback 
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would not be used accumatively by preschoolers in forming 
expectancies. 
The means associated with the Game x Trial interaction 
for preschool children are shown in the upper portion of 
Table 15 and graphically in Figure 2. The simple effects 
test on the game by trial interaction at preschool was not 
significant, E(7, 672) = 0.80, R > .05, indicating that 
outcome feedback was not used accumatively in forming 
expectancies under either skill or chance conditions. 
Secondly, it was predicted that preschool children 
will exhibit higher expectancies for success than grade 
five children in both skill and chance games. This 
prediction involved comparisons of skill means across 
grades and of chance means across grades (shown in Table 
15) • 
Figure 3 represents the skill game means for grades 
five and preschool. Consistent with this prediction, the 
simple effects test on the grade by trial interaction for 
the skill game was significant, E(7, 1344) = 2.64, R < .01. 
Simple, simple effects tests on the skill game means 
indicated that the grade condition difference occurred 
between preschool and grade five on trials 1, 4, 5, 6, and 
7. The significant E values, in respective order, are 
E(l, 1536) = 5.10, R < .05; E(l, 1536) = 8.33, R < .01; 
E(l, 1536) = 8.99, R < .01; E(l, 1536) = 8.77, R < .01, and 
E(l, 1536) = 18.75, R < .001. 
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Figure 4 shows the chance game means for grades five 
and preschool. Simple, simple effects tests on the chance 
game means of the grade by trial interaction indicated that 
the grade condition difference occurred between preschool 
and grade five on trials 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8. The 
significant E values, in respective order, are E(l, 1536) = 
4.45, p < .05; E(l, 1536) = 7.10, p < .01; E(l, 1536) = 
20.06, p < .001; E(l, 1536) = 22.46, p < .001, E(l, 1536) = 
9.67, p < .01, E(l, 1536) = 10.61, p < .01, and 
E(l, 1536) = 4.93, p < .05. 
Sixth Hypothesis 
The sixth hypothesis stated that skill conditions are 
related to higher expectancies for success than chance 
conditions for all children. It was predicted that both 
preschool and grade five children will show higher 
expectancies for success in the skill game compared to the 
chance game. The sixth hypothesis involved comparisons of 
skill trial means and chance trial means separately for the 
preschool and grade five groups. 
The skill and chance trial means for grade five, which 
are presented in Table 15, are represented graphically in 
Figure 1. Simple effects tests indicated that the game 
condition difference for grade five children occurred 
between skill and chance games on trials 2, 3, 5, 7, and 8. 
The five significant E values, in respective order, are 
E(l, 1536) = 8.13, p < .01; E(l, 1536) = 40.86, p < .001; 
E(l, 1536) = 13.24, p < .001; and E(l, 1536) = 4.90, 
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R < .05, E(l, 1536) = 17.06, R < .001. 
The skill and chance trial means for preschool are 
presented in Table 15, and represented graphically in 
Figure 2. Simple effects tests indicated that the game 
condition difference occurred between skill and chance 
games on trials 5, and 8 for preschool. The two 
significant E values, in respective order, are E(l, 1536) = 
11.71, R < .001 and E(l, 1536) = 4.50, R < .05. 
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Discussion 
Phase i 
Phase 1 of the current inquiry represented an 
independent replication and extension of investigations by 
Bialer (1961) and Penk (1969) regarding the relationship 
between competence-based internal locus of control and age. 
Bialer (1961) posited that mental age, rather than 
chronological age, was the more relevant variable related 
to the inclination among children to perceive internal 
locus of control. 
Data from the current inquiry, which were obtained 
from a cognitively average subject sample, did not support 
Bialer's (1961) assertion that mental age is the salient 
factor related to competence-based internal control. 
Results of Phase 1 supported the first hypothesis that 
perceived competence is directly related to chronological 
age in children. It was found that older children 
responded more frequently in the perceived competence 
direction of locus of control on the Children's Locus of 
Control Questionnaire (Bialer, 1961), than younger 
children. 
The age related increments in perceived competence 
shown by elementary school children are consistent with the 
prediction that, as they grow older, children become 
increasingly more aware that competence influences their 
environment. 
The current findings are consistent with those of Penk 
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(1969) regarding the progressive relationship between 
competence-based locus of control and chronological age, 
and extend the convergent validity of Bialer's scale to a 
preschool population. This is some evidence that older 
children are higher in the generalized expectancy that 
reinforcement occurs as a result of their own competence. 
The data are also consistent with evidence from 
Milgram (1971) who found age related progressions in locus 
of control using the Bialer Scale (1961) with 80 elementary 
school children in grades one, four, seven, and ten . 
Milgram (1971) concluded that age related increments 
in internal locus of control imply that children become 
increasingly competent in manipulating their environment 
and increasingly aware that their own behavior is 
instrumental in producing desired outcomes and avoiding 
undesired outcomes. 
The second hypothesis of Phase 1 was concerned with 
the inverse relationship between contingency-based locus of 
control and age, which was first delineated by Weisz (1980, 
1981) and Weisz and Stipek (1982). These researchers based 
their hypothesis of locus of control upon the Piagetian 
explanation of chance conceptualization (Flavell, 1963; 
Piaget & Inhelder, 1975). 
Results of Phase 1 showed that younger children 
responded more frequently in the perceived contingency 
direction on the Piaget-type scale of chance 
conceptualization than older children. The finding of age 
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related decrements in perceived contingency supports the 
prediction that young children make more judgments which 
attribute causal dependency to random events than older 
children. Preschool children seem to have more difficulty 
than their older counterparts identifying the noncontingent 
nature of chance controlled outcomes. 
A case can be made for the developmental character 
of the contingency variable studied here, and for the 
qualitative immaturity of the cognitive system of the 
preschool child compared to the fifth grade child. The 
strong negative relationship between chronological age and 
perceived contingency lends additional support to the 
Piagetian theory of chance conceptualization. It also 
provides evidence for the convergent validity and utility 
of measuring the contingency construct with the Piaget-type 
instrument developed for the current study. 
In general, the findings of Phase 1 support the 
multidimensional view of locus of control, which was 
proposed by Pargament, Sullivan, Tyler, and Steele (1982) 
in a study of relationships between a variety of locus of 
control and individual competence measures. These 
researchers found low-order positive correlations between 
internal control and measures of competence, and low-order 
negative correlations between measures of control by chance 
and competence. 
The data also sustain speculation by Weisz and Stipek 
(1982) that, while adults may use various combinations of 
72 
both competence and contingency information to make 
judgments about whether they can exercise control, 
preoperational children may find it difficult to use both 
dimensions concurrently. They may rely exclusively on the 
more salient control relevant dimension of contingency. 
In addition to substantive issues, Phase 1 examined 
the psychometric properties of the Children's Locus of 
Control Questionnaire (Bialer, 1961) and the Piaget-type 
measure of chance conceptualization. Discriminate validity 
of the two scales was supported by their low and 
insignificant intercorrelation indicating that they were 
measuring different dimensions of control expectancies. 
Internal consistency reliabilities for the Bialer 
scale were moderate and consistent for preschool and 
grade five children suggesting that both age groups 
responded to the questionnaire in a systematic manner. 
Stability estimates both across and within grade 
levels for the Bialer and Piaget-type scales were moderate 
in value and somewhat variable. 
Test-retest reliabilities for the Bialer scale were 
significant for preschool and grade five children although 
the stability of responses was higher for the grade five 
children. 
Bialer (1961) used his scale extensively with 
intellectually subaverage subjects of a mental age 
equivalent of 3 years, 10 months. However, the question 
was raised whether children as chronologically young as 
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preschool age understand the content of the Bialer scale 
even when read to them by the examiner. In the Milgram 
(1971) study mentioned above, test-retest correlations for 
the Bialer Scale at grades one and seven were not 
significant. The presence of a significant test-retest 
correlation for preschool and grade five in the current 
study may be taken as some evidence of understanding by 
the children of the items in the Bialer scale. 
Nevertheless, the lower test-retest correlation obtained 
for the younger age group recommends some caution in this 
interpretation. 
Test-retest reliabilities for the Piaget-type scale 
were significant for both groups. However, in this 
comparison, stability coefficients were higher for the 
preschool children than for the grade five children. 
Inspection of the test protocols supports the 
interpretation of generally greater sophistication, defined 
by evidence of relatively mature chance conceptualization, 
but higher variability in the drawings of older children. 
This finding is consistent with Piagetian theory 
(Piaget & Inhelder, 1975) which would predict that the 4 to 
5 year old children (M = 5.2) in the younger comparison 
group are solidly within the preoperational range (4 to 7 
years), and are thus expected to lack an internalized 
standard of randomness. Whereas, 10 to 12 year old 
children (M = 11.1) in the older comparison group are 
beginning the stage of formal operational thought in which 
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the concept of randomness first appears but may not yet be 
consolidated. 
Rater reliability for the Piaget-type scale was, 
obviously, adequate. There were some responses on fifth 
grade protocols which were problematic, but these anomalies 
did not affect total scores enough to jeopardize 
reliability, and most responses were clearly either random 
or systematic. 
The scoring guidelines, which were developed for the 
Piaget-type scale, established adequate conventions for 
determining the ambiguous responses, and also provided an 
expanded operational definition of contingency, defined by 
this method. 
The results of this correlational phase of the current 
study represented some exploratory evidence that 
contingency-based locus of control and competence-based 
locus of control can be operationalized reliably in a 
developmental context. Phase 2 of the study was an attempt 
to apply these constructs in an experimental investigation 
using different operational procedures and methods. 
Phase~ 
The various significant interactions of Phase 2 
indicated that expectancies vary as a function of age, 
situational cue, and outcome. Gender differences emerged 
in neither the preschool nor the grade five groups. While 
preschoolers started with, and maintained, higher 
expectancies, fifth grader's expectancies changed more in 
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response to success and failure. The results revealed 
that, within this experiment, perceived competence and 
perceived contingency influenced expectancies for success. 
Analysis of the data supported the third hypothesis 
that skill conditions are related to the perception of 
internal locus of control in children at the cognitive 
stage of formal operations. This hypothesis was based on 
combined evidence from Rotter's (1966, 1975) theory of 
locus of control, Piaget's explanation of chance 
conceptualization (Flavell, 1963; Piaget & Inhelder, 1975), 
and results of Phase 1 of the current investigation. 
The expectancies of grade five children varied 
systematically with outcome history in the skill game. 
These children showed the predicted pattern of usual 
expectancy shifts, which consisted of accumulatively higher 
expectancies following success and accumulatively lower 
expectancies following failure. Findings suggested that 
cognitively mature children are more likely to conclude 
that outcome feedback is determined by the internal control 
factor of competence when they are in the skill situation. 
This finding extends, to fifth grade children, Rotter's 
hypothesis of locus of control, which was derived from 
studies with adults (James & Rotter, 1958; Phares, 1957; 
Rotter, Liverant, & Crowne, 1961). 
In regard to the fourth hypothesis, results supported 
that chance conditions are related to the perception of 
external locus of control in children at the cognitive 
76 
stage of formal operations. Grade five children showed a 
systematic pattern of unusual expectancy shifts in the 
chance game. Their expectancies varied inversely with 
outcome history, that is, they showed accumulatively lower 
expectancies after success and accumulatively higher 
expectancies after failure. 
This conclusion is consistent with Rotter's (James & 
Rotter, 1958) prediction that mature subjects will show 
more unusual shifts in behavior in chance situations, 
operationally defined as "a raise in expectancy following 
negative reinforcement or a decrease in expectancy 
following positive reinforcement" (p. 398). However, the 
current investigation was more successful than previous 
research with adult volunteers (James & Rotter, 1958; 
Phares, 1957; Rotter, Liverant, & Crowne, 1961) in showing 
evidence for unusual expectancy shifts or the gambler's 
fallacy. 
The fifth hypothesis was supported that preoperational 
children impose subjective order on both skill and chance 
situations. This hypothesis developed out of the work of 
Weisz {1981) which was based on Piaget's explanation of 
chance conceptualization {Flavell, 1963; Piaget & Inhelder, 
1975). It was also consistent with evidence from Phase 1 
of the current study which suggested that young children 
are likely to over estimate contingency because of an 
immature understanding of probability and randomness. 
Statistical analysis of Phase 2 data confirmed the 
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first prediction of hypothesis five that preschool children 
do not use outcome feedback systematically in forming their 
expectancies. Evidence of stable expectancies 
(insignificant shifts) in both games suggested that 
preoperational children are inclined to overlook outcome 
feedback in forming expectancies, and to rely on subjective 
judgments which exaggerate contingency. 
Results correspond to findings from Weisz (1981) who 
determined that young children predict certain minimal 
outcomes (baselines) under conditions of skill and chance, 
apparently disregarding past outcomes in their estimates of 
future performance. 
This conclusion is supported by Parsons and Ruble 
(1977), who examined the development of achievement-related 
expectancies in children. Based on models of attribution 
and cognitive developmental theory, these researchers 
determined that success/failure experiences have a more 
systematic effect on the expectancies of school-age 
children than on the expectancies of preschoolers. 
In addition, Siegler and Liebert (1974) reported 
similar findings in an experimental investigation of 
outcome regularity and age on the causal judgments of 
kindergarten and third grade children. Evidence was 
consistent with Piagetian theory. While outcome regularity 
in a sequence of learning trials influenced the causal 
statements of third grade children, it did not influence 
kindergarten children who persisted in nonconservation 
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judgments with apparent disregard for outcomes. 
The patterns of stable responses across trials shown 
by preschool children in the current study imply a 
cognitive mediational explanation of development and the 
theory that young children operate by different cognitive 
rules than adults and older children. 
Results of Phase 2 supported the second prediction 
stemming from hypothesis five that preschool children show 
higher expectancies for success than grade five children. 
Preschool children demonstrated higher expectancies in both 
games than their older counterparts. This finding is 
compatible with the general decline with grade in the over 
estimate of contingency observed in Phase 1 of the current 
study, and observations of Piaget (Piaget & Inhelder, 
1975), and Weisz (1981). 
In particular, Piaget (Flavell, 1963) reasoned that, 
in the preoperational period from about age 3 or 4 to age 
7, young children's causal attributions retain some of the 
egocentrism of the infant, and consequently they are 
expected to respond immaturely to the skill versus chance 
dichotomy by overestimating success. 
Parsons and Ruble (1977), in the study described 
above, also found that younger children report consistently 
higher expectancies for ability related success. However, 
these researchers speculated that the observed 
developmental decline in expectancies with age might 
reflect: an increase in response to failure by older 
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children, a decrease in perceived ability by older 
children, or an increase in the understanding by older 
children that it is more socially acceptable to express 
less rather than more certainty of success. 
The interactions observed in the current inquiry are 
more compatible with the explanation offered by Weisz 
(1981) than those suggested by Parsons and Ruble (1977). 
Firstly, grade five children showed a wider range of 
expectancy in response to both success and failure than 
preschool children, not merely a greater response to 
failure. Secondly, evidence from Phase 1 of the current 
study suggests that awareness of competence actually 
increases with age. Lastly, significant increases in 
expectancy of grade five children following success are 
inconsistent with the social desirability explanation. 
The final hypothesis stated that skill conditions 
induce higher expectancies for success than chance 
conditions for children. Analysis of the data showed that 
both preschool and grade five children had higher 
expectancies for success in the skill game than in the 
chance game. 
The current data extend to children the findings of 
previous studies on adults using the locus of control 
model. Spec~fically, Phares (1957) observed that the mean 
magnitude of expectancies for success of adults was higher 
in skill situations than in chance situations; and Rotter, 
Liverant, and Crowne (1961) concluded that adult volunteers 
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verbalized greater expectancy for success in skill 
situations than in chance situations after the first 
positive reinforcement and cumulatively. 
General Discussion 
On a theoretical level, the current findings suggest 
that all learning may not be accounted for in terms of 
conditioning processes, but rather that some integration of 
S-R and cognitive-developmental theories might have 
heuristic value toward a parsimonious explanation of the 
data. 
The results generally lend support to Piaget's 
developmental theory of chance conceptualization that 
actual qualitative differences exist in the causal 
reasoning of children of different ages. This obviates the 
continuous, quantitative explanations of cognitive 
development posited by S-R and social learning theorists. 
In the Piagetian framework, cognitive immaturity is 
associated with young children's tendency to infer causal 
connections in random situations, while outcome regularity, 
operationalized in this experiment as the trial factor, 
would not exert an appreciable influence. The findings of 
Phase 1 and Phase 2 are consistent with this theory. 
Indeed, when compared to their fifth grade counterparts, 
preschool children obtained higher perceived contingency 
scores on the Piaget-type scale in Phase 1, showed higher 
expectancy scores on both games in Phase 2, and were not 
dissuaded from maintaining higher expectancies in response 
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to failure on the predetermined outcome schedule (trial 
effect). 
These findings are consistent with observation of 
Shaklee and Tucker (1979), which indicate that children's 
judgments of ability become more outcome differentiated 
with increasing age. These researchers used experimental 
procedures with preschool and second grade children to 
explore the role of information-summary skills in making 
inferences about an actor's ability. Shaklee and Tucker 
concluded that preschool children do not base their own 
judgments of ability on performance outcomes across 
trials. 
Other investigators have reported similar response 
perseveration by young children on models involving 
hypothesis-testing and discrimination learning. In an 
experimental study of hypothesis testing, Gholson, Levine, 
and Phillips (1972) presented kindergarten, second, fourth, 
sixth grade, and college students with discrimination 
problems. Kindergarten children almost always persisted in 
stereotypic repetitions of an hypothesis or rule despite 
its disconfirmation. For example, kindergarten children 
often showed stimulus preference in response to outcome 
feedback. This was reflected in win-stay and lose-stay 
discriminations similar to those made by preschool children 
in the current study. Whereas, second grade and older 
children showed progressively more characteristic 
hypothesis testing behavior, that is, keeping confirmed 
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hypotheses, rejecting disconfirmed hypotheses, as was shown 
by fifth graders. 
Gholson et al. (1972) described the stereotypic 
repetitions of kindergarten children as learning sets or 
hypothesis response sets. The subject showing response 
sets makes systematic choices but these choices are 
independent of outcome. The hypotheses more characteristic 
of older children were described as prediction hypotheses. 
In this case, the subject predicts how rewards will be 
obtained and acts so as to maximize rewards. 
In another developmental study of hypothesis testing 
behavior using cognitively delayed and average children, 
Weisz (1977) confirmed that five, seven, and nine year old 
children show prediction hypotheses most of the time. 
Furthermore, Ingalls and Dickerson (1969) confirmed 
that fifth, eighth, tenth grade children and college 
students solved discrimination learning problems by 
hypothesis testing and that problem solving efficiency 
increases with age. 
Gholson's (1981) model of hypothesis testing is 
relevant because it represents an attempt to integrate 
psychological theories in order to parsimoniously explain 
developmental differences in problem solving behavior, 
which are similar to those found in the current 
investigation. 
According to Gholson (1981), problem solving tasks 
induce the child to develop a set of hypotheses or rules. 
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These hypotheses are tested until consistently correct 
responses are achieved. This process requires an executive 
or integrative function which reflects underlying cognitive 
capabilities which change qualitatively with development. 
The integrative element is designated the cognitive scheme, 
and it is identified with cognitive operations described by 
Piaget. 
Kendler (1981) posits a related model to account for 
similar findings of developmental differences in problem 
solving behavior. The model incorporates connectionist and 
cognitive paradigms by way of a levels of functioning 
explanation. Young children are expected to learn single 
discrimination problems relatively slowly and to show more 
response sets compared to adults who are expected to solve 
these problems more rapidly and to show more prediction 
hypotheses. The inclination to show prediction hypotheses 
is considered to increase with age, however, the increase 
will be gradual rather than stepwise as would be implied by 
Piagetian cognitive theory. The distinction from Gholson 
is that Kendler argues that response sets are not 
hypotheses because, by definition, they are not responsive 
to feedback. 
The current investigation lends support to Gholson's 
view (1981) that response sets are hypotheses. 
Kindergarten children showed not only stable response 
patterns to outcome, but also higher expectancies for 
success than older children regardless of game type. The 
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S-R model predicts that expectancies for success gradually 
increase with age, whereas the Piagetian cognitive model 
predicts that young children begin with high expectancies 
for success and gradually lower their expectancies through 
interactions with the environment. 
Future Research 
Seen in its broadest context, the current 
investigation prompts questions about how human's develop a 
conception of order in their environment. In the 
structuralist or organismic model, the task is quickly 
accomplished, in part, as a consequence of biological 
predispositions, but initial operating hypotheses used by 
the child for learning are subsequently revised through 
maturation and interaction with the environment. In the 
connectionist model, the infant gradually learns to 
manipulate the environment, but the rules for learning do 
not change qualitatively. 
Consideration of the sources of evidence in this 
study lends support to the structuralist view as explicated 
by Piaget. However, neither model seems sufficient and 
some integration of structuralist and connectionist 
paradigms may be fruitful. Such a synthesis of cognitive 
and S-R principles is not entirely inconsistent with 
aspects of social learning theory in so far as it 
accommodates a cognitive mediational approach and 
conditioning principles. Of course, the continuous 
learning paradigm would likely be modified. 
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The development of causal inferences and expectancies 
for success are important to the solution of all sorts of 
problems, and the simplification of current psychological 
theory through the successful integration of structural and 
connectionist paradigms would be a particularly worthwhile 
endeavor. 
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Appendix A 
Name: DOB: 
------------------------- -----
DOE: 
-----
School 
--------------
Male/Female 
BIALER LOCUS OF CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRE 
In the administration of the questionnaire, the subject is 
asked to respond with "yes" or "no" to each item. The 
letter "f" indicates that a "yes" response is scored as 
internal control. The letter "p" signifies that an answer 
of "no'' is scored as internal control. The scale is scored 
in terms of the total number of responses in the direction 
of internal control. Examiner circles "Yes" or "No" as 
indicated. 
Instructions 
This is not a test. I am just trying to find out how 
kids your age think about certain things. I am going to 
ask you some questions to see how you feel about these 
things. There are no right answers to these questions. 
Some kids say "yes" and some say "no." When I ask the 
question, if you think your answer should be yes, or mostly 
yes, say "Yes." If you think the answer should be no, or 
mostly no, say "No." Remember, different children give 
different answers, and there is no right or wrong answer. 
Just say "Yes" or "No," depending on how you think the 
question should be answered. If you want me to repeat a 
question, ask me. Do you understand? All right, listen 
carefully, and answer "Yes" or "No." 
lp. When somebody gets mad at you, do you usually feel 
there is nothing you can do about it? Yes. No. 
2f. Do you really believe a kid can be whatever he wants 
to be? Yes. No. 
3f. When people are mean to you, could it be because you 
did something to make them be mean? Yes. No. 
4f. Do you usually make up your mind about something 
without asking someone first? Yes. No. 
5f. Can you do anything about what is going to happen 
tomorrow? Yes. No. 
6f. When people are good to you, is it usually because 
you did something to make them be good? Yes. No. 
7f. Can you ever make other people do things 
you want them 
to do? Yes. No. 
(appendix continues) 
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8f. 
9f. 
lOf. 
llp. 
12f. 
13f. 
14f. 
15f. 
16f. 
17f. 
18p. 
19p. 
20f. 
21f. 
22p. 
23f. 
Do you ever think that kids your age can change 
things that are happening in the world? Yes. No. 
If another child was going to hit you, could you do 
anything about it? Yes. No. 
Can a child your age ever have his own way? Yes. No. 
Is it hard for you to know why some people do certain 
things? Yes. No. 
When someone is nice to you, is it because you did 
the right things? Yes. No. 
Can you ever try to be friends with another kid even 
if he doesn't want to? Yes. No. 
Does it ever help to think about what you will be 
when you grow up? Yes. No. 
When someone gets mad at you, can you usually do 
something to make him your friend again? Yes. No. 
Can kids your age ever have anything to say about 
where they are going to live? Yes. No. 
When you get in an argument, is it sometimes your 
fault? Yes. No. 
When nice things happen to you, is it only good luck? 
Yes. No. 
Do you often feel you get punished when you don't 
deserve it? Yes. No. 
Will people usually do things for you if you ask 
them? Yes. No. 
Do you believe a kid can usually be whatever he wants 
to be when he grows up? Yes. No. 
When bad things happen to you, is it usually someone 
else's fault? Yes. No. 
Can you ever know for sure why some people do certain 
things? Yes. No. 
Comments: 
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Appendix B 
Name: DOB: 
----------------------- ----
DOE: ____ _ 
I ors. 
School 
-------------
TRAJECTORY DRAWING FORM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Male/Female 
0 
0 
What will happen if the box is moved many times? I ors. 
Will the marbles get back to where they started? Yes or No. 
Comments: 
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Appendix C 
Scoring Criteria for Children on the Piagetian Game of 
Random Mixture and Reversibility 
Points 
1 
6 
1 
1 
1 
6 
3 
6 
3 
6 
Criteria 
Spatial Displacement. A marble returns to its 
original position (marble moves out of its 
position in a straight line and returns in the 
same way). 
Total Spatial displacement. Draws all marbles 
returning to their original positions. 
Total verbal displacement. Verbalizes return 
of all marbles to their original positions. 
Replacement A. A colored marble on one side 
changes places with a marble of a different color 
on the other side in an equivalent position. 
Replacement B. A colored marble on one side 
changes places with a marble of a different color 
on the other side in an opposite position. 
Total replacement. Complete crossing of all the 
marbles to equivalent positions on the other 
side. 
Failure to cross the midline with three marbles 
of one color. 
Failure to cross midline with all marbles. 
All three marbles of one color move one 
position to right or left consecutively. 
All red marbles move one postion toward black 
side and all black marbles move one position 
toward red side. 
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Appendix D 
Muller-Lyer Reference Design 
\ I 
\ I 
\ I 
\ I 
\ I 
. 
I \ 
I \ 
I \ 
I \ 
I \ 
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Appendix E 
Muller-Lyer Stimulus Design 
I \ 
I \ 
I \ 
I \ 
I \ 
\ I 
\ I 
\ I 
\ I 
\./ 
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